Property—Real Property—Restrictive Covenants by Vaccaro, Anthony J.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 4 Number 1 Article 56 
10-1-1954 
Property—Real Property—Restrictive Covenants 
Anthony J. Vaccaro 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anthony J. Vaccaro, Property—Real Property—Restrictive Covenants, 4 Buff. L. Rev. 107 (1954). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol4/iss1/56 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
to prove that an easement appurtenant to the mill lot had in fact
been contemplated. In that event the amount of water available
to defendant would be controlled by the quantity which the grantor
had used for the mill, the present use of water being irrelevant.11
. The dissenters, citing Flora v. Carbean2 and Matter of Find-lay1 3 further maintained that since both parties had agreed in the
lower courts that the right in question was an easement appir-
tenant to the mill lot, the Court of Appeals had no right to aban-
don that theory which would have produced a different result.
Restrictive Covenants
A restrictive covenant provided that land could not be used
for:
(1) A commercial garage, or automobile parking lot
(2) A public garage or public automobile filling station.
(5) Clubs, lodges, and social buildings in which dancing or
bowling may be an incidental use; . . .
A development association attempted to enjoin the owners of
a refreshment stand from using part of their land as parking area
for patrons.1 4
The court felt that the meaning of the restriction was clear
from the covenant itself. "Parking lot" considered in conjunc-
tion with commercial garage indicated that the land could not be
used for the business of storing automobiles for a stipulated price.
If a public parking lot were intended to be prohibited, it would
have been so stated in the restriction on public garages. The
court also rejected the contention that incidental parking was
restricted, because the covenant expressed clarity when incidental
use of the land was prohibited as in clause number five, supra.
The court did not rest solely on what appeared plain to them,
but recognized that the spirit of our law favors the free and un-
obstructed use of property, 5 and applied the rule that if a re-
strictive covenant is capable of more than one interpretation, it
will be construed against the party attempting to extend it.'6
11. Comstock v. Johnson, 46 N.Y. 615 (1871) ; 3 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS 2286 (1904).
12. 38 N.Y. 111 (1868).
13. 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930).
14. Premium Point Park Ass'n. v. Polar Bar, 306 N.Y. 507, 119 N.E. 2d 360
(1954). See Schoonmaker v. Hecksher, 171 App. Div. 148, 157 N.Y. Supp. 75 (1st
Dep't 1916), aff'd, 218 N. Y. 722, 113 N.E. 1066 (1916).
16. Ibid; See Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm, 267 N.Y. 242,
196 N.E. 42 (1935).
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